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OVERVIEW AND THE CENTER-RIGHT’S IMMIGRA-
TION RHETORIC-POLICY DIVIDE
 The immigration issue has caustic in the 
Italian arena and is one of the most salient issues 
for Italian voters. The Italian electorate is more 
xenophobic than most of its European counter-
parts. A 2003 German Marshall Fund survey found 
that 78% of Italians surveyed believed immigrants 
constituted an ‘extremely important’ or ‘important’ 
threat to Europe in the near future. A survey1 con-
ducted by the International Herald Tribune in May 
of 2007 found that 55% of Italians believe there are 
too many legal immigrants in Italy. This statistic is 
significantly higher compared with bordering na-
tions. When asked how they believe the illegal im-
migrant situation should be remedied, a stunning 
60% of Italians believe all illegal immigrants should 
be expelled. This percentage is the highest of any 
European nation surveyed.
 Italian center-right parties are especially 
1 The data was gathered using the statistical polling 
database, Polling the Nations.
impacted by the immigration issue; center-right 
parties are seen as the most obvious advocates for 
more repressive immigration policies. There are 
four major parties of interest to this analysis, all 
of which made up Berlusconi’s center-right coali-
tion from 2001 to 2006. First was Berlusconi’s own 
party, Forza Italia (FI), generally representative of 
business interests. Second was Gianfranco Fini’s 
post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN) party. Third 
was the regionalist and populist Lega Nord (LN) 
headed by Umberto Bossi. The last relevant actor 
includes the remnants of the once powerful Chris-
tian democrats, the Centro Cristiano Democratico-
Cristiani Democratici Uniti (Ccd-Cdu) which later 
formed the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani (UDC) 
(Geddes 2008). 
 These parties adopted xenophobic rhetoric 
mirroring the anti-immigrant sentiments of their 
respective bases. For example, in the 2008 general 
elections, the center-right’s xenophobic mantra 
manifested itself symbolically; single visible minor-
ity received the backing of the largest center-right 
party, Berlusconi’s Popolo della Libertà (PDL)2. In 
another incident, the right-wing regionalist LN 
party joined with protesters opposing the grant-
ing of land for the construction of a mosque near 
Milan by threatening to cover the area with pig 
manure (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 
2005). What is more noteworthy, however, is that 
such rhetoric seldom was transformed into policy. 
Consider the 2001 Bossi-Fini Act, a significant 
immigration reform bill pioneered by LN leader 
Umberto Bossi and FI leader Gianfranco Fini. The 
Act exemplifies that although far-right parties in 
center-right coalitions, such as the LN, are often the 
2 Statistic gathered from the Ministero dell’Interno 
(Ministry of the Interior) website: http://politiche.interno.it/
ind_poli.htm
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THE IMPETUS FOR CENTER-RIGHT PARTY MOD-
ERATION
 
 The academic literature provides several 
possible motives for center-right party modera-
tion. One prevalent argument offered in the politi-
cal literature deals with interest group politics; the 
preferences of centrist interest groups, specifically 
solidarist Catholics and functionalist employers, are 
responsible for the moderate policies adopted by 
center-right coalitions. Caponio (2005) argues that 
pro-immigrant groups could rely on Catholic orga-
nizations for lobbying support. Zincone (2006a) 
suggests that the Catholic bloc is reinforced by the 
support of functionalist employers’ organizations 
who favor the inflow of cheap labor. Because Catho-
lics and businesses make up a significant section 
of the center-right base, the effect of their prefer-
ences on center-right immigration policy cannot be 
discounted.
 A secondary explanation for moderate 
center-right immigration policy adoption is that 
center-right political actors are more informed 
with respect to the immigration issue. There is little 
evidence supporting a direct correlation between 
heightened immigration levels and rising crime 
rates or negative economic consequences. Data 
from the OECD and Istat show that although immi-
gration rates have steadily increased in the past de-
cade, yearly unemployment has actually decreased 
with time. Further, yearly real GDP growth rate has 
been relatively constant in spite of rising immigra-
tion levels. Finally, Bianchi et al. (2008:12) find 
that “total criminal offenses as well as most types 
of crime are not related to the size of immigrant 
population once endogeneity is taken into account.” 
This information is likely to be readily available to 
policymakers, whereas the public is more likely to 
not be aware of such statistics.
 A further possible explanation for why the 
center-right may wish to adopt moderate immigra-
tion policies is that center-right parties are re-
sponding to the increased diversification of Italian 
society. According to the OECD, the number of im-
migrants in Italy has risen from 1.5 million in 1995 
to 5 million in 2006. Center-right parties aware 
of the dynamic nature of their electoral base may 
catalysts of immigration reform, the resulting poli-
cies have largely maintained a social-welfare net 
for immigrants (Zincone 2006a). The Act resulted 
in the greatest case of regularization in modern 
Italian history, granting amnesty to some 634,728 
illegal immigrants (Zincone 2006a).  This case of 
right-wing parties endorsing repressive party plat-
forms yet adopting centrist immigration and visible 
minority policies is referred to in this paper as a 
rhetoric-policy divide. 
 A few relevant examples of the rhetoric-pol-
icy divide are henceforth provided. After the pas-
sage of the Bossi-Fini Act, The LN’s Maroni, acting 
as Welfare Minister, approved generous immigra-
tion rates, including 159,000 in 2005, the highest 
level in Italian history (Zincone 2006a). The larg-
est growth in legal immigrant population in Italy 
occurred between 2001 and 2006, when some 1.37 
million immigrants entered Italy (Geddes 2008). 
Maroni even proposed abolishing the quota system 
altogether in 2003, although the proposal proved 
too solidarist even for moderates in the govern-
ment, and subsequently never materialized into 
policy (Zincone 2006a). Another striking case of 
a moderate policy is that of AN leader Gianfranco 
Fini, who in October of 2003 as Deputy Prime Min-
ister introduced a bill granting immigrants the right 
to vote in local elections, reversing his prior opposi-
tion to such a practice (Zincone 2006a).
 In this paper, I forward a theoretical frame-
work linking the center-right’s immigration rheto-
ric-policy divide with the Italian culture of political 
patronage, two topics which, to the author’s knowl-
edge, have never been analyzed in tandem. I extend 
the selectorate theory to show how Italian center-
right politicians use political patronage to compen-
sate for moderate immigration policy adoption. I 
then argue that xenophobic voters face a collective 
action problem when voting for their center-right 
representative. Finally, I use multidimensional 
spatial representations to model the theoretical 
arguments developed in the paper and draw addi-
tional inferences. This political patronage approach 
is preferable over alternative theories because it 
can be generalized to explain other issue-driven 
rhetoric-policy divides in Italian politics.
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office.  A further subset of the selectorate, W, makes 
up the winning coalition, or the number of sup-
porters needed for an actor to remain in power. In 
order to stay in office (which Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (1999) define as the universal motivator of all 
political actors), actors consider the size of their W. 
When faced with a large W, policymakers are likely 
to attempt to gain the group’s support through 
the diffusion of public goods (Evans et al. (1993)), 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2008)). The non-exclud-
ability of the public good means that a member of 
an actor’s W can leave the coalition and still reap 
the benefits of the public good (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2008)). This means that it is relatively easy 
for people to leave a W if they are not pleased with 
the actor. Conversely, a policymaker facing a small-
er W will shift focus to key individual players, and 
the distribution of private goods becomes a more 
effective means to assemble a W (Bueno de Mesqui-
ta et al. (2008)). Because private goods are exclud-
able from others, each individual in the W benefits 
more than members of the selectorate. Therefore, 
members of an actor’s W will be less likely to defect 
because they will lose access to private goods, 
ensuring the politician’s re-election bid (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2008)).
 The selectorate theory offers answers to the 
center-right immigration dilemma. Center-right ac-
tors can keep their electoral base relatively satiated 
through the distribution of private goods. Because 
of the high saliency of immigration issues for the 
voter base of the center-right, private good diffu-
sion is likely to be more significantly used, render-
ing political patronage more widespread. Further, 
because of the prevalence of political patronage, 
the expected political (or legal) cost of engaging in 
such practices is not high (Del Monte and Papagni 
2007).
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE ON VOT-
ER BEHAVIOR
 
 Political actors would not diffuse private 
goods if they did not seek to affect voter behavior 
and enhance their re-election bids. I argue that 
the political patronage system is used by political 
actors to cause a systematic mass deviation in the 
therefore be seen as using policy as an appeal to 
the future electorate and using xenophobic rhetoric 
as an appeal to the present electorate.
 Clearly, there exist a myriad of possible 
motives for center-right immigration policy mod-
eration. Therefore, treat this condition as a given; 
Italian center-right parties want to achieve moder-
ate center-right policies. However, academic analy-
ses of how center-right actors are able to achieve 
this moderation are largely unsatisfactory. For this 
reason, I shift the focus from why center-right par-
ties wish to achieve moderate immigration policies 
to how they are able to do so. I argue that the com-
paratively high levels of political patronage in Italy 
grant political actors a mechanism to reverse their 
stated positions on immigration issues and adopt 
moderate policies. 
POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN ITALY AND THE SELEC-
TORATE THEORY APPLICATION
 Ever since the 1948 creation of a parliamen-
tary democratic republic, Italian politics has been 
plagued by unusually high levels of corruption and 
political patronage (Golden 2000, Golden 2003, 
Golden and Picci 2005). In fact, in 2000 Italy ranked 
as the most corrupt ‘wealthy democracy’, and had 
levels of corruption more reminiscent of under-
developed countries like Uruguay than developed 
European states like Germany (Golden and Picci 
2005). Rizzi and Stella (2007) estimate that up to 
700,000 Italians are supported or otherwise make 
their living off of the Italian political patronage 
system. Although some decrease in political patron-
age occurred after a significant anti-corruption 
campaign in the early 1990s named Mani Pulite 
(Clean Hands), the culture of political patronage 
clearly remains in present-day Italy (De Monte and 
Papagni 2007).
 The system of political patronage can be 
formalized through the selectorate theory devel-
oped by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2003), and Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2008). The selectorate theory assumes that in 
a state with N citizens, a subset of those citizens, 
S, known as the selectorate, actually plays a role in 
determining whether or not an actor remains in 
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further support of the conclusions of the political 
patronage approach, can be derived through spatial 
representations which draw loosely from the veto 
player framework of Tsebelis (2002).
 We begin by first representing the prefer-
ences of voters and MPs on a spectrum. Estimated 
policy and rhetoric preferences of voters and MPs 
are shown in Figure 2. The ideal point of the me-
dian voter is v and the ideal point of the median 
center-right actor is MP. The median voter’s reser-
vation point, or the point leaving the voter indiffer-
ent between re-electing and ousting the politician, 
is rp. We can derive that all points which are the 
same distance away from v as rp are also reserva-
tion points, and this is displayed through the indif-
ference curve which passes through rp (labeled ic). 
An MP facing an electorate with the preferences 
noted in Figure 2 can adopt any position which lies 
along or inside the ic, but not outside of it without 
being ousted from office.
 Now we can turn to a comparative statics 
analysis to assess the effects of private good diffu-
sion. Ceteris paribus, private good diffusion renders 
voters more accepting of positions which differ 
from their own. The result is that the reservation 
point becomes more solidarist, and the indifference 
curve shifts outward. This means that, after private 
good diffusion, the MP is able to adopt a position 
closer to his own ideal point while still maintaining 
the support of the voters. This is shown in Figure 3: 
before private good diffusion, the MP had to adopt 
position p, whereas after private good diffusion, the 
MP could adopt a more solidarist policy position, p’. 
 A question remains, however: why would 
center-right political actors mirror the preferences 
of the electorate on the rhetoric dimension? Con-
sider Figure 4; there are three MPs represented 
who all have the same ideal policy stance but 
differing ideal rhetoric stances. MP3, who mirrors 
the preferences of the electorate, is able to adopt a 
position (p3) which is more solidarist than either 
MP2 or MP1. Even without private good diffusion, 
center-right MPs seeking to adopt moderate im-
migration policies should mirror the rhetoric of 
the electorate. Thus, ceteris paribus, mirroring the 
electorate’s rhetoric allows the MP to adopt more 
solidarist policies.
payoffs (and therefore, the voting preferences) of 
the electorate. 
 First, voters may not be as aware of the 
policies endorsed by a specific politician but they 
are likely aware of their personal benefits incurred 
from private good diffusion; this creates a problem 
of asymmetric information. Another significant 
consideration that makes re-election more lucra-
tive to voters is the knowledge of the unfeasibility 
of cooperation. If the voters of an individual con-
stituency coordinate and oust their MP (Member 
of Parliament) but all other constituencies re-elect 
their MP, they no longer benefit from private good 
diffusion and the rhetoric-policy divide is relatively 
unaffected. This creates a collective action prob-
lem for voters; the benefit is incurred if all manage 
to coordinate (to oust their MPs), but each player 
suffers if they coordinate (oust their MP) while the 
rest defect (re-elect their MPs). Therefore, if people 
are risk-neutral (or risk averse), they have an in-
centive not to oust their MP.
 This analysis can be represented more 
formally by depicting a voter’s decision regarding 
whether to ‘re-elect’ or ‘oust’ as a decision tree, as 
shown in Figure 1. Suppose that a voter receives a 
payoff X-p from ousting and a payoff of kX from re-
electing, where 0<k<1. k  in this case is a measure 
of the relative decrease in utility caused by the MP 
adopting moderate immigration policies, and p is 
the decrease in utility to the voter caused by asym-
metric information and the knowledge of a collec-
tive action problem. In this case, if k>1-(p/X), then 
Po<Pr , where Po is the payoff from ousting and Pr 
is the payoff from re-electing. I argue for the likeli-
hood that, from 2001 through 2006, xenophobic 
voters received higher payoffs from re-electing 
than ousting, meaning that the reduction in payoff 
caused by p was greater than the reduction in pay-
off due to k. This ensured the continued re-election 
of politicians who were able to continue to adopt 
moderate immigration policies.
SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS
 So far, I have not provided an explicit reason 
why MPs would choose not to also moderate their 
rhetoric. The answer to this question, along with 
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